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A T T O R N E Y

Case
at a
Glance
After a government
contractor submitted an
application under the
Equal Access to Justice
Act for reimbursement
of fees and expenses,
including for paralegal
services, the Department
of Transportation Board
of Contract Appeals
reimbursed the
contractor for paralegal
services at the cost to
the attorney and not
the market rate. The
contractor appealed
the amount of
reimbursement.

F E E S

May a Prevailing Party Be
Awarded “Attorney Fees” for
Paralegal Services?
by Jay E. Grenig
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 262–266. © 2008 American Bar Association.

the original contract price should
have been higher to account for the
increased wages and associated
costs. The contracting officer denied
Richlin’s claim, and Richlin
appealed to the Department of
Transportation Board of Contract
Appeals. The government resisted
reformation of the contract and
defended the subsequent appeals on
the ground that Richlin bore the
risk of misclassifying its employees.

Jay E. Grenig is a professor of law
at Marquette University Law
School in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
He is co-author of Electronic
Discovery and Records
Management. Professor Grenig
can be reached at jgrenig@earthlink.net or (262) 646-3324.

After a series of appeals to the
Transportation Board and the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, the board awarded Richlin
the amount of the additional wages,
payroll taxes, and workers compensation premiums that Richlin was
required to pay. Richlin Sec. Serv.
Co., 02-2 BCA ¶ 31,876, 2002 WL
1042294 (DOTCAB 2002). The
Federal Circuit affirmed the board’s
decision. Richlin Sec. Serv. Co. v.
Ridge, 99 Fed. Appx. 906 (Fed. Cir.
2004).

ISSUE
Under the Equal Access to Justice
Act, are paralegal services “attorney
fees” compensable at market rates
subject to statutory caps or are they
“other expenses” compensable at
the rate of the cost to the attorney?

FACTS
Richlin Security Service Company,
a government contractor, agreed to
provide guard services for detainees
at the Los Angeles International
Airport. As the result of a mutual
mistake, the contracts misclassified
Richlin’s employees as “Guard I”
rather than “Guard II” for purposes
of the wage classification scheme of
the Service Contract Act (41 U.S.C.
§ 351 et seq.) The error resulted in
an underpayment of Richlin’s
employees.

Richlin then submitted a timely
application for reimbursement of
attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs

RICHLIN SECURITY SERVICE CO. V.
CHERTOFF, SECRETARY OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
DOCKET NO. 06-1717

In February 1995, the Department
of Labor determined Richlin’s
employees were entitled to back
wages. Richlin then filed a claim
against the government for more
than $1.5 million in back wages and
associated taxes on the ground that
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to the board pursuant to the Equal
Access to Justice Act (EAJA) for the
time its lawyers and paralegals
spent over nine years before the
board. The board determined that
Richlin was a prevailing party and
that the government’s position on
the merits was not substantially justified. The board then awarded
Richlin approximately $50,000 for
work done by Richlin’s lawyers.
The board did not award Richlin
fees at the $50 to $95 per hour market rates for paralegal services
charged to Richlin over the course
of the proceedings, however. The
board determined that the EAJA
does not “expressly provide for the
reimbursement of paralegal services
at the market rate.” The board ruled
that paralegal services were reimbursable only at the attorney’s cost,
even if the paralegal time was billed
to the client at hourly market rates
in the relevant legal market and not
at the attorney’s cost as an out-ofpocket expense. Taking judicial
notice of paralegal salaries in the
Washington, D.C., area, the board
awarded Richlin $35 per hour as the
“reasonable cost to the [law] firm.”
The board awarded Richlin approximately $10,600, representing 300
hours of compensable paralegal
time.
A divided panel of the Federal
Circuit affirmed the board’s determination. Richlin Security Service
Co. v. Chertoff, 472 F.3d 1370 (Fed.
Cir. 2006) (rehearing en banc
denied). The Federal Circuit stated
that if fees for paralegal services
were “attorney fees,” then in light of
the cap on attorney fees, law firm
charges for paralegal services would
be fully recoverable while charges
for attorney services would not,
leading to the overuse of paralegals.
Richlin’s petition for certiorari was
accepted by the Supreme Court.
128 S.Ct. 613 (2007).

CASE ANALYSIS
The Equal Access to Justice Act (5
U.S.C. § 504) authorizes an award
of fees and other expenses to certain parties who prevail against the
United States in court or in adversary administrative proceedings.
The EAJA provides, in pertinent
part:
(a)(1) An agency that conducts
an adversary adjudication shall
award, to a prevailing party …
fees and other expenses incurred
by that party in connection with
that proceeding, unless the adjudicative officer of the agency
finds that the position of the
agency was substantially justified
or that special circumstances
make an award unjust.
***
(b)(1) For the purposes of this
section—
(A) “fees and other expenses”
includes the reasonable expenses
of expert witnesses, the reasonable cost of any study, analysis,
engineering report, test, or project which is found by the agency
to be necessary for the preparation of the party’s case, and reasonable attorney or agent fees.
(The amount of fees awarded
under this section shall be based
upon prevailing market rates for
the kind and quality of the services furnished, except that (i) no
expert witness shall be compensated at a rate in excess of the
highest rate of compensation for
expert witnesses paid by the
agency involved, and (ii) attorney
or agent fees shall not be awarded in excess of $125 per hour
unless the agency determines by
regulation that an increase in the
cost of living or a special factor,
such as the limited availability of
qualified attorneys or agents for
the proceedings involved justifies
a higher fee.

Relying on Missouri v. Jenkins, 491
U.S. 274 (1989) (involving the Civil
Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act
of 1976—42 U.S.C. § 1988), Richlin
argues that fees incurred for paralegal services are compensable at
market rates under the EAJA. He
points out that paralegal services
are considered to be “attorney’s
fees” under the Civil Rights
Attorney’s Fees Awards Act and are
compensable at market rates if they
are billed separately on that basis in
the relevant legal community.
Richlin reasons that the Court’s
determination in Jenkins applies to
the EAJA because “attorney’s fees”
under section 1988 and “attorney
fees” under the EAJA are nearly
identical terms. The petitioner says
that Congress’s use of the same or
similar terms ordinarily should be
accorded the same meaning statute
to statute. Richlin contends the legislative history indicates that
Congress would not have expected
that market-rate recovery for paralegal services would result in
overuse of paralegals in comparison
to the higher-priced lawyers for
whom they work. Richlin declares
that limiting reimbursement for
paralegal services to the law firm’s
cost, as the Federal Circuit held,
would drive up the cost of litigation
for clients.
The government responds that
Jenkins does not support Richlin’s
position. It explains that Jenkins
involved the interpretation of a different fee-shifting statute with materially different language. The government points out that, except for
a narrow category of court “costs,”
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (the statute at
issue in Jenkins) authorizes reimbursement of prevailing civil rights
plaintiffs only for “attorney’s fees.”
In the EAJA, however, the government says Congress provided for
reimbursement of a second statu(Continued on Page 264)
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tory category—“other expenses”—
in addition to “attorney fees.” The
government argues that this second
category fundamentally changes the
analysis.
According to the respondent, in
Jenkins the Court’s task was to
define the term “attorney’s fees,”
and paralegal expenses were either
encompassed in that term or unrecoverable. The government stresses
that, in this case, by contrast, paralegal expenses can be recovered,
and the Court’s task is to decide
which statutory category encompasses paralegal expenses.
In addition, the government argues
the canon of construction that similar words should normally be construed similarly does not mean that
Jenkins should be extended to the
EAJA context. The respondent
argues that the canon readily yields
when, as in this case, it is reasonable to conclude from variations in
statutory text and context that the
words were intended to embrace different meanings. The government
says the Supreme Court has construed virtually identical language in
fee-shifting statutes differently when
the policy considerations and legislative history underlying the statutes
pointed to different outcomes.
The government claims the EAJA’s
legislative history underscores that
Congress intended the term “attorney fees” and the cap on such fees to
apply “only to the compensation of
lawyers” themselves and not to other
costs connected with their representation of parties. The respondent
says Congress made that intent plain
in the process of reenacting the
EAJA in 1985. It points out that the
Senate Report on reenactment
explained that attorneys’ out-ofpocket expenses should be compensated under EAJA as other expenses
and that “paralegal time” should be
reimbursed in that manner “at cost.”

Pointing out that the EAJA provides
for reimbursement for “fees and
other expenses” to prevailing parties, the government explains that
“fees” are categorized as attorney,
agent, and expert witness fees, the
reimbursement of which is limited
to prevailing market rates subject to
a statutory ceiling for each category.
The government argues that the legislative history of the EAJA demonstrates that paralegal expenses are
“other expenses” reimbursable at
cost, and not “attorney fees.”
The petitioner, Richlin, argues the
Federal Circuit erred in maintaining
that Jenkins is inapplicable because
of the EAJA’s adjustable dollar-perhour cap on attorney rates. Richlin
disagrees with the Federal Circuit’s
statement that if fees for paralegal
services were “attorney fees,” law
firm charges for paralegal services
would be fully recoverable while
charges for attorney services would
not, leading to the overuse of paralegals and undermining Jenkins’s
efficiency rationale.
According to Richlin, the Federal
Circuit’s view is misguided for a
host of reasons. Richlin asserts that
when the EAJA was enacted and
reenacted in 1980 and 1985, respectively, market rates for most or all
lawyers practicing in most locations
were at or below the EAJA cap.
Therefore, Richlin declares,
Congress would not have expected
market-rate recovery for paralegal
services to result in “overuse” of
paralegals in comparison to the
higher-priced lawyers for whom
they work. Richlin argues that limiting reimbursement for paralegal services to the law firm’s cost would
improperly drive up the cost of litigation for clients—the people that
EAJA was intended to benefit.
The government responds that the
most “natural” reading of “attorney
fees in 5 U.S.C. § 504 provides com-
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pensation for an attorney’s time
spent representing a party in litigation. According to the respondent,
“[i]n common parlance, ‘attorney
fees’ do not mean ‘paralegal’ expenses.” The government says that interpretation is bolstered by the surrounding text. It claims the EAJA’s
broader category of “other expenses” naturally captures costs
associated with an attorney’s representation of a party, but that those
costs are not themselves “attorney
fees.” While expenses for paralegal
assistance are not readily embraced
by the phrase “attorney fees,” the
government contends they fall comfortably into the EAJA’s second and
related category of reimbursable
“other expenses.”
Richlin says this is exactly the argument that the Supreme Court
rejected in Jenkins. The petitioner
emphasizes that the Court in
Jenkins found “self-evident” the
proposition that the statutory term
“attorney’s fees” includes the work
of paralegals “and [all] others whose
labor contributes to the work product for which attorney bills her
client.”
The government asserts, however,
that other provisions of the EAJA
confirm that “attorney fees” do not
include paralegal expenses. While
the EAJA requires that attorney fees
be calculated based on prevailing
market rates, the government points
out that Congress also imposed a
statutory ceiling on the amount
of “attorney fees” that may be
awarded. The respondent says that
Congress set the cap based on the
billing rates of attorneys and not the
rates of paralegals, which were dramatically lower. The government
therefore observes that when
Congress set the cap at $75 and later increased it to $125, the ceiling
capped “attorney fees” at a level
below that of many attorneys
nationwide. The government rea-
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sons that Congress’s decision to use
attorneys’ charged rates subject to
caps and its failure to impose any
analogous caps on paralegals’ rates
strongly suggests Congress thought
paralegal charges would be treated
as expenses (subject to the “cap” of
their actual cost).

interests EAJA seeks to protect. The
petitioner argues that basing the
client’s reimbursement for paralegal
services on what it costs the lawyer
to employ the paralegal leaves the
client with a cost bearing no rational
relationship to the costs faced by the
client or the EAJA’s purposes.

According to Richlin, treating paralegal services as compensable at the
cost of those services is at odds with
the judicial understanding of the
EAJA, under which cost-based
awards generally are for out-ofpocket expenses charged by thirdparty vendors. As examples, Richlin
cites items such as travel costs and
long-distance phone calls.

The government responds that the
Supreme Court should reject petitioner’s argument that, even if paralegal time is not compensated as
“attorney fees” and are “other
expenses” under the EAJA, “other
expenses” should be reimbursed at
the market rate paid by the client,
not at the cost of the attorney. The
government contends the petitioner’s argument is not fairly included
in the question presented, was not
pressed or passed upon below, and
therefore is not properly before the
Court. The government argues the
EAJA specifically provides that
attorney, agent, and expert witness
“fees” are to be awarded at prevailing market rates but makes no similar provision for “other expenses.”

The government argues that compensating paralegal expenses as
“attorney fees” would result in
EAJA awards for paralegal time that
are disproportionately high relative
to the fees that can be recovered for
ordinary attorney work (because
paralegal rates are generally much
lower than those of attorneys) and
would permit attorneys to recover
paralegal expenses that are near or
equal to the awards given for the
time of even extraordinarily experienced attorneys. To the extent that
litigation against the government is
informed by the availability of EAJA
fees, the government declares that
this anomaly could “distort the normal allocation of work” by encouraging attorneys to shift work to
paralegals (where they can recover
the full amount of, or at least a
greater proportion of, their normal
hourly rates) and thus “result in a
less efficient performance of legal
services.”
Even if it were appropriate under
the EAJA to reimburse paralegal
expenses at “cost,” Richlin says
reimbursement should be based on
the cost incurred by the client, not
by the lawyer. Richlin stresses that
it is clients—not lawyers—whose

If there were any doubt as to the
proper construction of “attorney
fees,” the government argues, the
canon of construction that “the
scope of waivers of sovereign immunity should be narrowly construed
in favor of the sovereign” compels
the conclusion that paralegal
expenses are not a type of “attorney
fees” within the meaning of the
EAJA. The government says nothing
in the EAJA’s text requires a contrary result, particularly because
the EAJA’s provision of “other
expenses” aptly captures paralegal
expenses necessary for the preparation of a party’s case.

SIGNIFICANCE
The Supreme Court is called upon
to resolve a dispute between the
Federal Circuit and four other circuits. Disagreeing with the Federal
Circuit, four circuits have held that

a prevailing party may be awarded
attorney fees for paralegal services.
See Role Models America, Inc. v.
Brownlee, 353 F.3d 962, 974 (D.C.
Cir. 2004); Hyatt v. Barnhart, 315
F.3d 239, 255 (4th Cir. 2002); Miller
v. Alamo, 983 F.2d 856, 862 (8th
Cir. 1993) (interpreting similar language in 26 U.S.C. § 7430); Jean v.
Nelson, 863 F.2d 759, 778 (11th Cir.
1988), aff’d on other grounds sub
nom. Immigration & Naturalization
Serv. v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154 (1990).
Given the frequency with which
attorney fee questions arise under
the EAJA, resolving this split of
authority will provide a greater
degree of clarity and consistency.
Amicus curiae suggest that a decision affirming the Federal Circuit
would reduce the use of paralegals
in administrative proceedings,
increasing the costs for clients. The
amici also assert that a decision
affirming the Federal Circuit would
prolong administrative proceedings
and result in time-consuming hearings to determine appropriate reimbursement rates.
The government suggests that compensating paralegal expenses as
attorney fees would result in EAJA
awards for paralegal time disproportionately high relative to the fees
that can be recovered for ordinary
attorney work (because paralegal
rates are generally much lower than
those of attorneys). The government
says this would permit attorneys to
recover paralegal expenses that are
near or equal to the awards given
for the time of even extraordinarily
experienced attorneys. To the
extent that litigation against the
government is informed by the
availability of EAJA fees, the government asserts that anomaly could
“distort the normal allocation of
work” by encouraging attorneys to
shift work to paralegals (where they
can recover the full amount of, or at
least a greater proportion of, their
(Continued on Page 266)
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normal hourly rates) and thus
“result in a less efficient performance of legal services.”

ATTORNEYS
PARTIES

FOR THE

For Petitioner Richlin Security
Service Co. (Brian Wolfman (202)
588-1000)
For Respondent Michael Chertoff,
Secretary of Homeland Security
(Paul D. Clement (202) 514-2217)

AMICUS BRIEFS
In Support of Petitioner Richlin
Security Service Co.
National Association of Legal
Assistants, Paralyzed Veterans of
America, and the National
Organization of Social Security
Claimants’ Representatives (Amy
Howe (202) 237-7543)
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